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Karel van der Molen
Apr 269 min read

BROKEN GATES: REVEALING THE FAILURES OF SECURITY VETTING

By Karel van der Molen




Security vetting is a critical process employed by governments worldwide to safeguard their national interests, protect sensitive information which they hold, and to mitigate security risks, both from within and outside of their borders. This has been the case over many centuries (see “Security Vetting – an introduction and some initial thoughts” - the first article of this series) where there has been a need for governments, organisations, and institutions to put in place processes that are aimed at assessing and confirming the integrity, trustworthiness, and reliability of individuals working within sensitive sectors, particularly the public sector.


In keeping with the "Do-Re-Mi" (The Sound of Music”) earworm theme of the first and second articles (the second being “Shielding the gates: Unravelling the art and history of stringent security vetting procedures”), the author would like to offer the following. The opening words and notes of the familiar song each represent a logic of controlled musical progression, much as the processes that governments, organisations and institutions must put in place towards safeguarding integrity and trust - the introductory "Do" of the initial screenings, to the elaborate "Re" of background checks, and then finally to the thorough "Mi" of the verification procedures.


But, while this lyrical and harmonious description seems to lead towards a whimsical melody of process, there is the discordant note that can arise - as would be the case if the members of a Swedish death metal group are asked to sing the chorus of “Edelweiss” - the harmony of security vetting is often marred by the failures of the various processes. There have been, over the years, various weaknesses and failures of security vetting that have led to the scrutiny, evaluation and identification, drawing a metaphorical parallel, of the broken gatekeeping processes that has revealed gaping vulnerabilities in the process. "Broken Gates" serves as a distressing notice of the necessity to strengthen our fortifications and ensure that security vetting plays the necessary pivotal role in ensuring the integrity and reliability of individuals entrusted with positions of trust and responsibility.


“Eskom ‘unaware’ of security agency’s request for vetting information about André de Ruyter”.

(Mail & Guardian, 30 November 2022).


“SABC without a board as new candidates await state security vetting”.

(News24, 18 October 2022).


“Two former ministers relied on non-existent legislation to allow illegal vetting of SAA staff”.

(News24 [City Press], 5 January 2022).


“SA’s police commissioner Fannie Masemola has no security clearance – report”

(The Citizen, 18 March 2023).


These headlines opened the author’s first article and are a small sample of the wide-ranging issues that affected (and continue to affect) South African organisations as regards the security vetting of key personnel. Nkuna (2020) sketches a disturbing picture of the failures of vetting procedures in the South African Police Service, while Lucas (undated) has pointed out the legal HR-related difficulties and “impact of the vetting investigation on an employee in terms of the LRA [Labour Relations Act, 1995]”. While these are issues that affect the very essence of the employment, and the responsibilities, and most importantly, the accountabilities of those personnel (a few examples of which will be dealt with later), there are instances of other vetting failures that have come to the fore in recent months.


News24 carried a story in 2022 that the “Former Prasa engineering head who falsified qualifications [had been] convicted for fraud” for misrepresenting his qualifications to Prasa, claiming to have a master's degree from the University of the Witwatersrand, and a doctorate in engineering management from the Technische Universitat Munchen in Germany. In June 2023, the “Johannesburg Roads Agency CEO [was] sacked after [a] fake qualification probe”. The background to this matter was that the person had noted in his CV that he held a doctorate - which turned out could be bought for a small "support honorarium" from a Trinity International University of Ambassadors in the United States. The person’s CV further reported that he had a Master's degree in "competitive intelligence" from ACI College, Harvard Business School. However, this degree is not offered at Harvard, and ACI is a separate college. The CV also stated that he obtained an "undergraduate engineering degree from the Vaal University of Technology", but it was just a diploma for a course to become [author’s emphasis] an engineering technician.


It should not be thought that instances of this nature occur only in public sector organisations. Two cases have been widely reported this year (2024). The first of these related to an oft-interviewed and oft-quoted South African economist who was exposed for allegedly not holding a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics and who, when this came to light, resigned from her positions on the boards of a major mining house and a leading cell phone company. She was also removed from the Presidential Economic Advisory Council which is a non-statutory body and for which, interestingly, there is no formal vetting.


The second case that came to light was that of the co-founder of a prominent investment firm, which manages assets worth R1.6 billion of clients including municipal pension funds and other major institutions. He admitted that he had never worked for McKinsey & Co and JP Morgan, nor did he have the degrees listed on his CV. These included interestingly ­(author’s emphasis) the London School of Economics. He stated that it was due to an “administrative error” that the degrees were shown on his profile (two bachelor’s degrees, an honours’ degree and various other qualifications) - while he admitted that his highest qualification is an A Level school-leaving certificate he obtained in Zimbabwe.    


Andrew Woodburn, a leading South African expert on recruitment and selection practices, in response to the first case noted above stated that he believed that he does believe that corporate South Africa is “taking heed [... and] will lift its game to ensure that the vetting is improved”.


There are two further aspects that should be highlighted at this point. The issue of fake or non-existent qualifications is certainly not a new one and has been the subject of extensive research (Jimu, 2018). It should also be noted that recent South African legislation, the National Qualifications Framework Amendment Act, 2019 (only proclaimed in October 2023) stipulates that it is a criminal offence to misrepresent qualifications, the punishment for doing so may be a hefty fine and/or imprisonment for a period of up to five years. There is also a provision that a person will be guilty of an offence if they “falsely or fraudulently claim to be holding a qualification or part-qualification [...] obtained from a lawfully recognised foreign institution”. This process is nothing new as similar practices have been in place for a number of years in Australia, India, New Zealand and the Netherlands.


This then allows for a neat segue into the case of Arthur Fraser (Fraser), a former a senior official in the now-defunct National Intelligence Agency, briefly a senior official in the Department of Home Affairs, then the Director-General of the State Security Agency (SSA) from 2016 to 2018 and thereafter the National Commissioner for the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) from 2018 to 2021. Questions were raised about the integrity and the efficacy of the vetting process when it came to light that Fraser had claimed (and it was posted on the SSA and DCS websites) to have a degree from the University of London, whereas he had obtained a degree from the London College of Communication which, at the time, was known as the "London College of Printing".


The question should then be asked as to how the vetting process was conducted and what documents were submitted by Fraser at this time. The author was unable to trace any detailed information on this matter, but it should be noted that this issue was canvassed in the Judicial Enquiry into State Capture Report, the so-called Zondo Commission Report, in Volume VI (“All the Recommendations”). In the interest of completeness, it is prudent to quote a relevant portion (Recommendation 86 at page 111): “Then there was the abuse of the vetting system. For example, questions were asked about the regularity of Mr Arthur Fraser himself, the former DG of the SSA, regarding his top-secret clearance certificate which was said to have been issued on an expedited basis; while the practice of expedited clearance was acknowledged, questions arose about the need to do so in his case”.


It should also be noted that the Commission also referred to the fact that there “was the most glaring abuse of the vetting system by Mr Fraser himself”.



"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"


This Latin phrase, often attributed to the Roman poet Juvenal, translates as "Who will guard the guards themselves?" or "Who will watch the watchers?" expresses the same sentiment of questioning the accountability of those in positions of authority.


In this regard, and to quote (in full) from the above Recommendation, “there was the most glaring abuse of the vetting system by Mr Fraser himself. Once the Inspector General of Intelligence, Dr [Setlhomamaru] Dintwe, told him [Fraser] that he was investigating him because of certain activities, Mr Fraser invoked Dr Dintwe's clearance certificate! Dr Dintwe had to go to court to have his certificate restored [...]. Another case of apparent abuse of the vetting system was the withdrawal, or refusal, of the security clearance certificate to the former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Mxolisi Nxasana, who Mr Zuma may have feared was poised to reinstate criminal charges against former President Zuma.”


In any society, the integrity and trustworthiness of law enforcement and security personnel are paramount. It is therefore essential to ensure that those entrusted with authority, such as Fraser and others, undergo rigorous vetting processes in order to maintain public confidence and uphold the rule of law. But it is equally essential that those are entrusted with the oversight of law enforcement and security personnel carry out their responsibilities with all the necessary authority and without fear or favour.



Another interesting matter that came to light in March 2023 was that the national police:


commissioner, who had been appointed the year before did not have security clearance at the time - and it was further reported that his security clearance had expired in 2019, apparently due to debt. The Minister of Police defended the commissioner at the time and blamed the State Security Agency for this matter. The author has not been able to ascertain whether the security clearance of the commissioner has been reinstated.


The broader issue, however, is that the absence of security clearance for a police official (or, for that matter, any senior or other official where clearance is required, but is not in place) has profound ramifications on the security landscape of a country. Without such clearance, critical information regarding national security threats and sensitive operations may be inaccessible, hindering effective decision-making and response capabilities. This lack of clearance undermines the credibility and integrity of law enforcement, erodes public trust in the institution tasked with safeguarding citizens and maintaining law and order. The lack of security clearance for such a pivotal role represents a significant vulnerability in the overall security apparatus of the country.


With these reflections, it is clear that a concerted effort from both government agencies and private entities is required to deal with the issues discussed in the article (and the many of which you, the reader, are aware). It is only through a commitment to transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement that we can begin to mend these broken gates and safeguard the security of the nation and its institutions for the future.



 

* Readers may recall that the author has penned two articles on the issues of security vetting: “Security Vetting – an introduction and some initial thoughts” and “Shielding the gates: Unravelling the art and history of stringent security vetting procedures”. Readers who are new to the newsletter or those who would like to reread the earlier articles, kindly contact the editor or visit the journal’s archives.


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